> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.darkbloom.dev/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Agent sandbox security and privacy

> What each boot attests, what is encrypted, what Darkbloom can and cannot see, how secrets work, and which confidentiality claims the product does not yet make.

> [!WARNING]
>
> Darkbloom can decrypt your workspace, and agent sandboxes do not yet claim
> confidentiality from the owner of the Mac they run on. Do not keep production
> credentials or regulated data in a sandbox.

## Attestation

Each boot comes with a statement that the Mac's Darkbloom agent asserts with an
Apple App Attest key: what runs (the qualified agent build, the image, kernel,
and VM configuration, the egress policy) and the keys the guest generated,
bound to the fresh nonce your CLI chose and to your SSH key, whose private half
only you hold.

Your CLI checks it against Apple's App Attest root, the Darkbloom release key
compiled into it (which signs the list of qualified builds), and Darkbloom's
build-revocation list, before `ssh`, `vnc`, `codex`, `secret set`, and the MCP
server's `sandbox_exec`, and pins the host key the boot attests: your CLI
accepts no other host key for that boot. `darkbloom-sandbox-cli attest sbx-…`
prints what it attests.

## Your connection

`ssh`, `vnc`, and `codex` traffic is encrypted end to end between your machine
and the attested guest: Darkbloom's gateway relays it and cannot read it in
transit. The Mac's owner controls the machine the guest runs on, so this is not
a claim of confidentiality from them. See [what is not claimed
yet](#what-is-not-claimed-yet).

## Your workspace

Your workspace is stored encrypted on the Mac. Its key is kept by Darkbloom
and released, sealed to the boot's attested key, only to an attested boot.
**Darkbloom can decrypt your workspace**: do not keep anything there you would
not trust Darkbloom with.

The encryption does not detect tampering: the Mac's owner could corrupt or roll
back parts of it, and the sandbox would not notice.

## Secrets

Send a secret with:

```sh theme={null}
darkbloom-sandbox-cli secret set sbx-… NAME < value
```

Secrets are sealed on your machine to that boot's attested key and land as
`/run/secrets/NAME` in the guest (on macOS, in its RAM disk at
`/private/var/run/darkbloom-ram/secrets/NAME`). The service carries them sealed
and does not open them.

A secret lasts one boot (it is sealed to that boot's key): send it again after
each resume. Each is 1 byte to 64 KiB, at most 32 per sandbox.

## What Darkbloom records

Darkbloom records:

* account, sandbox, and Mac identifiers;
* sizes, platforms, states, and the reasons for them;
* timestamps, billed seconds, and charges;
* your SSH public key and the device name `login` registered;
* the hostnames you allow;
* the hostnames of connections the gateway refused;
* per-sandbox connection and byte counts at the gateway, kept per boot for 90
  days, for abuse handling and any daily egress limit;
* the IP addresses your requests come from (access logs).

Outbound HTTPS goes through the gateway, which sees each destination hostname
and how much flows, not the encrypted content. Darkbloom does not record what
you type, your screen, or your files.

## What is not claimed yet

Agent sandboxes are an early product. Darkbloom does not yet claim that a
sandbox is confidential from the owner of the Mac it runs on: the hardware
checks that would back that claim are still being completed.

Treat a sandbox as a convenient, isolated development environment, not as a
place for production credentials or regulated data. Report anything that looks
like a security issue to your Darkbloom contact at once, rather than testing it
further.


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